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Abstract   
In this paper I am concerned with contemporary industrial societies’ ability to extend 
themselves into the far future by economic, scientific and political means on the one 
hand and their inability to know the potential, diverse and multiple outcomes of this 
produced futurity on the other. I focus on this discrepancy between the future 
extension of action and knowledge in order to consider how we (as citizens and 
academics) may be better able to take responsibility for such long-term and often 
unknown and unknowable effects. I want to explore what strategies are available for 
situations where the industrial way of life creates long-term futures but our conceptual 
tools to know those outcomes are woefully inadequate. I seek to a) establish the status 
quo by outlining current practices and b) explore today’s available options for 
forethought and moral action. In the process I revisit historical approaches to the 
future on the assumption that the past may well hold vital clues for today’s dilemma.  
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Minding Futures 
A Social Theory Exploration of Responsibility for Long Term Futures 
 
Introduction: Production of futures  
The creation of the future is what makes us human. It is the mark of culture. From 
earliest burial rituals to megalithic temples and today’s products of technology, 
futures have been produced as a means to escape our biology. With the knowledge of 
individual finitude arises the quest for transcendence of the earthly condition. One 
way to achieve transcendence is to posit a world beyond the life of birth and death, a 
world of eternal life, a spirit world of origin and destiny from whence we came and 
return to after death. Another is to create islands of permanence in the sea change: 
through rituals and myths, symbols and externalised communications, rules and 
traditions, institutions, artefacts and temples. Another still is to extend the present, 
that is, to borrow from the future for the benefit of individual and social life now. The 
time scales involved have always been ambitious. They ranged from forever more in 
the realm of the ancestral netherworld to the time of granite, from the hero’s life told 
in legend and song to the sacred world of immortalised understanding in underground 
caves, from the preservation of the soul for the afterlife to the quest for nirvana, from 
the techno-future of print to the half-life of plutonium and the open future of 
genetically modified organisms. 1 
 
Industrial societies have extensively colonised the future as a means to counter not 
just finitude but also the uncertainty that accompanies existence unto death. Safety, 
salubrity, security, solvency, stability, success and sustainability seem to be the 
motivating forces for their forays into the future. By bringing the future into the 
present, uncertainty gets tempered, transformed into a risk factor to be calculated and 
managed on the basis of a known past. Science and economics were the tools through 
which this reigning in of the uncontrollable was accomplished until, that is, the 
outcomes outgrew the tools of their creation and the consequences outstripped the 
capacity to absorb the unintended negative effects. The power to affect the future 
turned out to be far greater than the capacity to imagine and know it.  
 
This gulf between the ability to produce long-term effects and the radical inability to 
accompany our actions to their eventual destinations is the central concern of this 
paper. In the endeavour to close the gap I explore some ethical traditions we might 
draw on. I further scrutinise the conceptual tools at our disposal to deal with this 
travesty and, more generally, search for paths that guide us towards more appropriate 
means to take responsibility for the futures of our making. This encompasses attempts 
to enrol forgotten traditions for entirely new purposes and involves processes I would 
like to call ‘memory of futures’.  
 
 
Identification of the Problem 
Gap between production of futures and forethought 
To fully appreciate the problem I draw examples from the technological futures that 
best illustrate the disjuncture between ability to act, knowledge and moral response. 
These include electronic communication, nuclear power, genetic modification and 
nano-technology. All can be considered major successes of the industrial age; all have 
                                                 
1 See Adam 2004 for an extended discussion on this subject, also Lifton 1979. 
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contributed significantly to the socio-economic and cultural progress of industrial 
societies and their rise to global dominance. In each case, however, the coveted 
success is linked to unforeseen problems, which our societies seem singularly ill-
equipped to deal with. This applies whether we focus on electronically organised 
finance with its run-away financial markets and its unpredicted collapses of banks, 
pension funds and insurance companies or whether we are concerned with the long-
term unchecked, uncontrolled and uncontrollable radiation from nuclear installations, 
test sites and accidents. This success-problem axis is clearly discernible whether we 
attend to deliberations of proponents, opponents or regulators of genetically modified 
food or listen to debates on cloning and tissue engineering from a scientific, political, 
economic, or religious perspective.  
 
Battle lines are clearly drawn across these techno-spheres, which produce long-term 
and often open-ended futures. Proponents stress the benefits to present and future 
generations, the promise and progress through the advance in knowledge. They 
emphasise the collective duty not only to rise to the challenge of creating alternative 
futures, but also to fulfil our destiny to subdue nature. Opponents, in contrast, 
underline the uncertainties, risks, dangers and social devastation, both actual and 
potential, that are wreaked by these enterprises. They argue that the scale of 
unintended polluting outcomes is such that it exceeds the sink capacity of our earth. 
They counteract the utopian enthusiasm of proponents with prophesies of doom and 
gloom about unforeseen and unforeseeable health problems. They warn of the dangers 
of applying technological fixes to problems caused by technology. They see hazards, 
hunger and human tragedy where proponents expect pre-eminence, progress and 
profit. 
 
Despite their irreconcilable stances regarding the various future-constructing 
inventions, however, proponents and opponents of technological progress share some 
taken-for-granted assumptions. These are rooted in a history of ethics that extends 
back to Greek Antiquity, and an Enlightenment thought tradition that underpins 
positivist science, classical economics and liberal democracy. They involve location 
in the present, the Derridian ‘metaphysics of the present’, and a perspective on the 
future as external to and separate from the present. It is important to look more closely 
at the taken-for-granted ethical and conceptual bases in question, given that they 
shape the arguments that are brought to bear on the contested issues, and delimit the 
potential range of available alternative visions. As unquestioned and unquestionable 
habits of mind, I want to argue, they constitute invisible barriers to knowledge 
practices that might otherwise close the responsibility gap addressed in this paper. 
 
Habits of mind: moral, scientific, economic and democratic 
The western moral code, as it was set out in Greek Antiquity, had a number of 
features that are no longer appropriate to the contemporary condition and thus tend to 
stand in the way of responding to the responsibility gap in a way that befits today’s 
situation. Even with adaptations at pivotal historical turning points, argues the 
philosopher Hans Jonas (1984/1979) in his seminal The Imperative of Responsibility, 
a number of assumptions survived to this day. Moral action was reciprocal and 
focused exclusively on the intra-human realm. It was mostly contained within the city 
walls. Traditional ethics were consequently concentrated on actions of immediate 
reach and close proximity in time and space. The long-term future, in contrast, 
belonged to the non-human sphere of fate and chance, providence and destiny. It was 
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out of human reach and thus beyond ethical concern. Moreover, the nature of things, 
humans and the human condition was thought to be fixed and unchanging. In this 
ethics of the here-and-now of shared presents, the good was known and what was 
right undisputed. The city as domain of human influence had no more than a 
superficial impact on nature’s balance and awesome force. That is to say, the strictly 
bounded transformative power of humans left nature largely unchanged in its 
formative and creative power. These preconditions to the traditional western moral 
code no longer apply. What has been assumed fixed is today subject to change. 
Consequently good and evil become objects of debate and definition. The 
contemporary operational realm of human action, finally, extends into a very long-
term, open future. With this expansion of reach it is no longer appropriate to think and 
act with reference to neighbours and contemporaries, kin and the next generation. 
 
The changed socio-technical conditions of contemporary industrial societies thus 
present new ethical challenges that are rooted in the gap between the power to act and 
the capacity to know, and are primarily centred on the imperative of responsibility. It 
is Jonas’ central argument that this imperative has no precedent in the history of ethics 
and thus requires ethical innovation on many fronts. Since our contemporary 
technological capacity impacts on nature in a new way – changing the balance of its 
forces, its regenerative power and its evolution, to name just a few examples – the 
ethical sphere has to be expanded so as to match the realm of human influence in both 
time and space. It has to transcend the human realm and encompass nature and the 
universe. It has to reach beyond the present to the techno-future of our making. It has 
to embrace not just next of kin but generations of potential successors as far into 
future as our actions are extended by way of influence and impact. This imperative of 
responsibility requires that responsibility be adequate to the sphere of influence. This 
very reasonable demand, however, moves ethics from the tangible sphere of spatially 
delimited rights and duties to contemporaries and compatriots towards the open and 
unlimited realm of beings and organism unborn and unknowable, thus taking it into 
virgin ethical territory. 
 
The kind of changes that are necessary to even conceive of such responsibility are 
addressed in this paper and they extend beyond ethics to an exploration of knowledge 
and implicit assumptions, so that this change in ethical practice may become possible. 
To this end I attend to the dominant conceptual tools associated with the industrial 
way of life, and scrutinise them for their suitability to this task. In western industrial 
societies these dominant conceptual tools arise from the triad of science, economics 
and liberal democracy where they have been naturalised to a point of having become 
habits of mind. As taken-for-grated habits, these ways of understanding operate at a 
deep structural level, delimiting the relationship to futures of our making. Thus, only 
when the ethical code is supported by a renewal of the conceptual tool kit, I want to 
argue, is the ground appropriately prepared for taking responsibility for our actions 
and the attendant spheres of influence. The taken-for-granted assumptions that 
underpin scientific, economic and political knowledge, therefore, need to be surfaced, 
explicated and renewed together with moral traditions identified by Jonas as 
precondition to an ethics of responsibility that is adequate to and appropriate for the 
contemporary condition. 
 
Let us begin with science as the first element of industrial societies’ triad of 
knowledge. Scientific knowledge in the classical (Newtonian) mode is established 
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around materialist, objective knowledge, causal analysis and a positivist methodology. 
In this traditional scientific perspective the world is made up of physical objects in 
motion. For natural scientists (and the scientists of other disciplines who emulated 
them) this perspective on reality became perceived truth until the early twentieth 
century when a more relativist understanding started to unsettle the hitherto 
unquestioned belief in a material world as distinct from, and external to, the scientific 
observer, and began posit a physical reality that was neither accessible to the senses 
nor amenable to objective and verifiable measurement. What continued largely 
unchallenged, however, was the belief that (with the exclusion of the quantum level) 
events are governed by the laws of cause and effects, that all motion has preceding 
causes, and that therefore the past is source of all knowledge of the present and 
ground for projected and predicted futures. This meant that scientific truth and 
foresight continued to be established on the secure base of a known past.  
 
Belief in causality, however, delimits scientific expertise with regard to outcomes of 
innovative science and its technological applications, which are rarely amenable to 
knowledge extrapolated from the past. The scientific production of the future, in form 
of technological innovations, it seems, stands in an inverse relation to the capacity to 
know the scientific creations with all their potential consequences. That is to say, the 
techno-scientific ability to produce futures is not matched by scientific knowledge of 
futures thus created. This gap between science-based action and scientific knowledge 
of impacts raises the spectre of structural irresponsibility at the very core of science: 
for the translation of scientific knowledge into products and for the scientific guidance 
that underpins inter/national regulation and politics. 
 
It is precisely this traditional form of science, we need to appreciate, which is relied 
on to guide political practice and decision-making processes. That is to say, scientific 
evidence (rooted in a known past) is regularly called upon to arbitrate between 
opposing views and positions, be this at the local, national and international level of 
policy. Difficulties clearly arise when the conventional science is to arbitrate in 
situations of uncertainty where there is no past precedent from which the future could 
be projected with reasonable measure of certainty. In such situations scientific experts 
tend to disagree with each other and their predictions to invariably fail. Examples 
would be cases where scientific evidence was relied upon to assist the political 
process with policies on radiation and public health, the safety of genetically modified 
food or nano-technology products, licences for biomedical patents and medicines, as 
well as international regulations governing chemical compounds, herbicides and 
pesticides.   
 
The stereotype of this traditional scientific knowledge is of course not adhered to 
when scientists perform their craft and translate their knowledge into scientific 
practice. For science in practice tends to combine the rational pursuit of the scientific 
ideal with imagination and intuitions as well as hunches grounded in embodied 
knowledge, without giving much thought to the matter. This is so because much of 
human futurity is not of the kind that can be extrapolated from a known past. Rather, 
it is open-ended, rooted in being unto death and irreducibly tied to human freedom. 
Our futurity, in other words, is marked by anticipation, fear, hope and desire; by the 
capacity to use our imagination, calculate and speculate, plan and make choices; by 
entering contracts, honouring obligations, taking responsibility and acting on trust; by 
being guided by ideals, passions and ambitions as well as ethics, morals, faith and 
  6
visions of how the world ought to be. In everyday life, it seems, people (including 
scientists) bracket past-based causality, casting aside its restrictions by living futurity 
and practicing protention. In their daily lives people extend themselves without 
difficulty towards their potentially real futures for which there are no precedents to 
provide them with certainty: bringing up children, tending to the garden, taking a 
flutter on the stock-market, protesting about the animal welfare or the war in Iraq. For 
politicians, managers and leaders of all kinds, the future is their routine field of 
operation whether they are making budget decisions, overseeing innovations or taking 
charge of the restructuring of their organisation. 
 
The taken-for-granted assumptions that underpin classical economics form the second 
element of the knowledge triad that concerns us here. Classical economics, like 
Newtonian science, encompasses very distinct assumptions about the future that 
inform and guide not just business and finance but also political decisions. The 
economic future is equated with money. It is calculated with reference to credit and 
debt, profit and loss and with regard to risks that are to be balanced out and averted. 
As an economic resource the future is traded, managed and controlled like any other 
resource. It is commodified. Costs and benefits of specific futures are established with 
reference to their utility for the present. In order for its present value to be established, 
the future is discounted. This entails calculating its utility value from the standpoint of 
the present with the result that the value of an event or product decreases with its 
temporal distance. From this utilitarian present orientation the future is exploited at 
the expense of successors’ presents, life chances and future potential.  
 
Neither this economic borrowing from the future for the benefit of the present, nor the 
past-orientation of evidence-based science bode well for closing the gap between the 
power to act on the one hand and knowledge of potential outcomes on the other. 
Neither discipline’s approach to the future, provides a conceptual base upon which 
responsibility could be established for eventual and potential long-term impacts of 
those future-creating actions. The question is whether or not liberal democratic 
politics, the third element of the knowledge triad, is better placed to achieve this task.  
 
Liberal democracies tend to delimit periods of government on average to four or five 
years. The policies and regulations established by elected representatives during their 
time in office, however, are usually intended for much longer periods. Decisions they 
make today about nuclear, chemical and biological technologies, for example, will 
outlast them not just by decades but millennia. Thus, when risks and hazards, created 
within the jurisdictional time-space of a particular liberal democracy, transcend those 
boundaries, the impact is in effect externalised: to other nations and/or to successor 
generations. The problem is shunted along, moved outside the sphere of 
responsibility. This means the effects of policies are not just experienced by the 
voters, their children and their children’s children, but by an open-ended chain of 
generations without vote, voice or advocates to speak for them. In the absence of any 
higher time-space authority, hazards externalised in time and space are no longer 
recognised in principle as the concern of the offending nation’s representative 
government in office. The policies pursued by contemporary liberal democracies, 
therefore, transgress not only the spatial but also the temporal boundaries of their 
political mandates and realms of jurisdiction. Furthermore, since elected 
representatives are responsible to their electorate only, and since it is this electorate 
that bestows legitimacy on a government, the rights of future and distant people who 
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cannot enact that power relation are ‘discounted’ in a way that is analogous to the 
discounting of the future in economic processes. The effects of the two discounting 
practices seem to be the same: the further away the potential hazards or degradations, 
the less they count for considerations in the present. 
 
If the democratic deficit at the very core of liberal democratic politics is the first 
problem regarding the gap between the production of the future and responsible 
forethought, the second relates to the knowledge base upon which decisions are made, 
given that scientific knowledge is the unquestioned source of evidence and economics 
the taken-for-granted justification for decisions. Yet, as I have suggested above, 
science and economics are inappropriate sources of knowledge for responsible 
political engagement with the future. Neither provides suitable conceptual tools with 
which to be mindful of potential outcomes of economic and scientific actions. Neither 
is appropriate for taking responsibility for possible impacts. This choice of 
inappropriate knowledge base for approaching futures of our making in a more 
responsible manner is to occupy us for much of the remainder of this paper.  
 
First I wish to revisit the ethical questions involved and explore the moral tools at the 
disposal of industrial societies to deal with the problem of responsibility identified 
above. Next I address industrial societies’ lack of appropriate conceptual tools alluded 
to above. I want to look at those moral and conceptual tools in more detail and 
scrutinise other means for their usefulness and adaptability to the problem in question 
before bringing the two issues together in the paper’s closing section. 
 
 
Problems for an Ethics of and for the Future  
The traditional context for western ethics and morals was the polis, the public realm 
of social relations and human debate. In both praxis and reach moral acts pertaining to 
that realm tended to be in close proximity: with family, friends and fellow citizens. 
Because the effects of socio-political actions were limited in both time and space, 
Jonas (1984/1979: 12-17) proposes that persistence rather than change was the task of 
moral action. The virtuous, which was considered synonymous with ethical 
behaviour, was to be achieved in the here-and-now world of political debate. This 
present-based morality, he suggests further, was counterbalanced by an orientation to 
eternity: the good and the beautiful, truth and virtue, ideas and ideals. The nature of 
responsible action, therefore, was defined with reference to eternal values. These were 
to be enacted in the present, encompassing the members of specified communities.  
 
The combination of immediacy and eternity as the realm for ethics meant that the 
long-term future was not deemed a sphere for human planning and moral action. 
Rather, it was considered the domain of gods who decided over fate, providence and 
destiny. Knowledge of the future therefore required mediators, in the form of oracles 
and prophets, sages and soothsayers, to offer glimpses of the unknown and 
unknowable. There were exceptions to this general rule that moral action was 
bounded by proximity and the present on the one hand and framed by eternal values 
on the other. These included, among others, the Christian responsibility to God with 
its attendant quest for the salvation of the soul – what Jonas (1984/1979: 13) calls the 
‘ethics of fulfilment in the life hereafter’ – and the more recent secular politics of 
utopia, of which Marxism is a notable example.  
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In contrast to action in the Greek polis, actions involving non-human things in the 
sphere of techne were not considered of ethical significance. This attitude of 
excluding the production of things from ethical concern persisted from antiquity to the 
Enlightenment period. In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt (1958/1998) details 
the differences between work in the realm of techne and action in the sphere of polis. 
Work produced permanence through the creation of objects, artefacts and durable 
things shaped from nature’s impermanence and cycles of change. The world of work 
that produced these islands of physical permanence in the sea of change, Arendt 
explains, was considered outside the polis, the sphere freedom and moral 
responsibility. 
 
An obligation towards the posterity of a technologically produced, long-term future, it 
seems, arose only with the elevation of science to dominant knowledge. Jonas 
(1984/1979) suggests that the extension of ethics to the techno-sphere emerges with 
the capacity to create futures that outlast and out-reach the life spans of their 
originators and takes on an entirely new dimension once those long-term creations 
have the potential to threaten not only individual existences across space and time but 
also the continuity of the species and life as we know it. Today’s techno-futures, 
therefore, provide a context for responsibility that is fundamentally new and nothing 
in the established ethical traditions provides us with the appropriate moral tools to 
adequately deal with that altered condition. In contemporary industrial (and 
industrialising) societies the foundations for responsibility have shifted and/or 
extended from an individual to a collective base, from the exclusively human realm to 
biotic earth communities and beyond, from social life to techno-spheres, from the 
present to futures, from the local to the time-space distantiated2 realm of impacts.  
 
In order to grasp the significance of these changes for the capacity to act responsibly 
towards those produced potential futures, we need to look in a bit more detail at our 
traditional moral habits of mind and explore their limits and possibilities for 
adaptation as moral tools suited to the techno-futures of our making. Individualised 
responsibility, immediacy, eschatology and anthropocentrism are four characteristics 
of our deeply embedded ethical habits of mind that will serve as exemplars for the 
wider range of naturalised moral traditions in need of adaptation and transformation.  
 
Individual responsibility and immediacy  
Through the ages responsibility had been associated with individuals and their deeds. 
This approach still holds as far as actions among families, friends and neighbours, as 
well as fellow citizens and nationals are concerned. Since, however, the power of 
contemporary technological activity affects not just individuals, their immediate 
families and surrounding communities and nations but has the additional potential to 
impact on the living condition of all people now and into an open future, the moral 
project of modernity has become a subject of not only individual but also collective 
and international concern. Thus, Jonas suggests,  
…the doer, deed, and effect are no longer the same as they were in the 
[individual] proximate sphere, and which by the enormity of its powers forces 
upon ethics a new dimension of responsibility never dreamed of before. (Jonas 
1984.1979: 6) 
                                                 
2 A term introduced by Anthony Giddens in the late 1970s to encapsulate processes and associated  
impacts that are dispersed across time and space. 
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Thus, for example, the technological threat to clean air and water, to fertile soil and 
healthy food emanating from the industrial way of life is unbounded. It is ‘time-space 
distantiated’, affecting all present and future persons since everyone depends on these 
basic threatened resources. The charge to safeguard, continuity and maintenance of 
these essentials of human existence, Nigel Dower (1998) therefore argues, transcends 
morality grounded in individual responsibility.  
 
Industrial societies have the power to affect not just their immediate human 
surroundings but all of their earth environment and beyond to atmosphere and 
stratosphere. Moreover, because their actions impact not just on the present and 
immediate future but on all of time, this open time-space becomes de facto the object 
of our moral concern. This dual expansion of human reach in time and space, 
therefore lifts ethics onto an entirely new level. What arises from this is the 
unprecedented duty to care about what happens to unknown people (many not yet 
born) in unknown spaces and times. ‘Duty springs from the deed already underway’, 
writes Jonas (1984/1979: 128) for whom ‘the deeds of power generate the contents of 
the “ought”’.  The power to extend our impact across time and space therefore 
requires that new moral and conceptual tools be honed in order for ethics to become 
adequate to this socio-technical capacity. In this case, the ‘re-tooling’ involves a dual 
shift from eternity to temporality and an extension from the known to the unknown. 
The latter in particular means grounding contemporary morality not only in the 
material, physical world but also in metaphysics, which means literally in the realm 
beyond physics. Let us address both these points in turn.  
 
In a world where progress and accelerating change are the driving forces of the social 
system, an ethics grounded in a-temporal truths is no longer adequate to its task. The 
undisputable eternal good, the true and the beautiful cease to be appropriate moral 
guides for the relentless quest for progress where not just the environment but humans 
themselves are subject to such change. As Jonas notes,  
Homo faber is turning upon himself and gets ready to make over the maker of 
all the rest. This consummation of his power, which may well portend the 
overpowering of man, this final imposition of art on nature, calls upon the 
utter resources of ethical thought, which never before has been faced with 
elective alternatives to what were considered the definite terms of the human 
condition. (Jonas 1984/1979: 18) 
It requires an ethic of forethought, imagination and responsibility, which is grounded 
not in eternity but transcendence. As such, a temporal dimension is added to the moral 
calculus that had been absent from traditional ethical concerns in general, and Kantian 
imperatives in particular. 
 
More difficult still, the duty of care to and for unknown and unknowable futures – to 
that which does not yet exist – presents moral problems at the level of both principle 
and practice. This duty falls outside the principle of reciprocity, and outside the 
current legal principles of justice and obligations. It also transcends, as I show below, 
the political structures of liberal democracies and representative government in which 
future people cannot have a voice or vote. Jonas (1984/1979: 44-6) suggests that the 
first principle of an ‘ethics of futurity’ does not reside within ethics and its rules of 
conduct but is located instead within ‘metaphysics as a doctrine of being’. We must 
first agree, he proposes, that being takes priority over non-being/nothingness and thus 
constitutes a precondition to any moral imperative that may arise from this agreement. 
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That is to say, the right to exist, just like the right to clean air, provides us with 
grounds for moral action. It applies irrespective of whether or not the recipients of 
those rights are living now or yet to be born.  
 
Jonas (1984/1979: 107) responds further to the paradox of duty to the unknown and 
unknowable by arguing that due to human spontaneity, the unknown is always with 
us, it inescapably frames our decisions as an ‘invisible co-object’. Non-knowledge 
and engagement with the unknown, he continues, are ‘nothing but the moral 
complement to the ontological condition of our temporality’. Consequently, in our 
encounter with the unknown, it is the spontaneity grounded in human freedom that we 
are charged to guard and preserve as one of our highest goods. Our moral duty, 
therefore, is to ensure the future of being on the one hand and to prevent a future 
where humanity loses its capacity for spontaneity on the other, a situation that is most 
likely to arise with an excessive dependence on machines. Metaphysics rather than the 
physical world of products, I therefore want to suggest, is the truly human domain of 
moral knowledge practices. Metaphysics is thus the ground that needs to be regained 
from the dominance of materialist knowledge.  
 
Eschatology and Utopianism 
We tend to associate the opposite of materialism with the spiritual world of religious 
practice. Before the elevation of science to dominant knowledge the religious 
approach to the future played an undeniably central and all-encompassing role in daily 
life. Eschatology as the doctrine of death, judgement, heaven and hell is one long-
established, mostly religious way to engage with the domain of the future. For the 
sake of the soul’s salvation, activities of earthly life are focused on the life after death. 
From an eschatological perspective the future and the afterlife take precedence over 
life in the present. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber 
(1904-5/1989) describes this ethic in great detail as it pertains to Catholicism and 
Protestantism and traces the change from an inner-worldly ethic to a worldly 
asceticism. He shows how this shift towards a Protestant ethic laid the broad 
foundations for the secular quest of the future in the here and now. When the religious 
sentiment slowly faded from the concerted effort to secure the future in the here-after 
from a position of the present, capitalism could develop unfettered toward its 
contemporary expression, and eschatology re-emerged in secular form as utopianism, 
with Marxism its most prominent exponent3.  
 
While we can see from the above that the future is of equal importance to traditional 
eschatologies, utopias and contemporary industrial societies, it is the differences 
between them that are of interest here. For eschatologies and utopias the distant future 
was the primary motive for action in the present. Yet, the extent to which the human 
influence on that coveted future was conceived differed significantly between the 
religious and secular approaches. Whilst for the former God was firmly in charge of 
human destiny, for the latter the future was to be forged by human action. In 
contemporary moral responses to the techno-future, in contrast, the relationship is 
often reversed. Here the overwhelming uncertainty of outcome tends to be a primary 
motive for non-action and preservation of the status quo. The certainties of old no 
longer hold, are no longer applicable. Gone is the clarity of vision that guided future-
                                                 
3 On the subject of Marxian eschatology and utopianism, see Jonas 1984/1979, especially chapters five 
and six.  
  11
creating actions. Gone is the trust, which was essential to overcome doubt and 
uncertainty. Today’s globally networked connectivity and cumulative spontaneity of 
responses makes the certainty of utopian futures an unachievable goal. What posed no 
problem for religious and utopian belief systems becomes an unsurpassable obstacle 
for action in a world where science and economics constitute the dominant knowledge 
practices. I will return to this problem in later sections of this paper where I search for 
more appropriate responses to this very real problem. 
 
Anthropocentrism 
The transformative power of humans has always been extensive. In modern times 
however, this capacity has reached undreamt of heights, changing our relationship to 
nature.  Today nature is no longer the immutable backdrop to human action. Rather, it 
has become the subject of scientific invention and intervention. As such, nature has 
gained ethical significance and thus ceased to be ethically neutral. Our powers 
transcend the human realm to encompass nature and even the biosphere. This means 
that the anthropocentric principle, which held good for moral action since its earliest 
western beginnings, can be upheld no longer.  
 
And yet, if there exists to date no socio-political structure to represent the unborn 
peoples of the future, what chance is there to represent other species, current and 
potential, and more difficult still, other forms of existence? Mountains and valleys, 
oceans and riverbeds, the biosphere and the stratosphere – all are influenced by our 
actions. None have their current and future interests represented in the socio-
environmental polity of today. In this ethical vacuum science is our only arbitrator, 
economics our only justification to pursue the very narrow interest of the present. 
Despite this difficulty, however, the list of people who have sought to represent the 
unrepresentable are legion4, but with to date little impact on our socio-political 
structures which continue to operate on the basis of existing habits of mind, 
unperturbed by the sound arguments for fundamental change to the industrial way of 
life. 
 
In summary we can say that the contemporary condition presents us with 
unprecedented challenges for which traditional ethics prove substantially 
inappropriate and insufficient. To bridge the chasm between the techno-power to act 
and the inability to know effects on the one hand, and to take responsibility for the 
potential outcomes of those actions on the other, requires a radical change in moral 
perspective. It necessitates a shift and/or extension from individual to collectively 
constituted responsibility, from proximity and immediacy to ‘time-space distantiation’ 
and generations of unknown successors, from anthropocentrism to a moral sentiment 
that encompasses other species and the non-living realm of our extended earth 
environment.  
 
This request for change in perspective, moreover, must be conceived neither in terms 
of either-or choices nor on a dualistic before-and-after basis. Rather, we need to come 
to an understanding that can encompass complexity: what has been continues to 
features in the now and in what is to come. Past and future are implicated in the 
explicated moral challenges of the present. Most importantly, we need to realise that a 
                                                 
4 Aldo Leopold, John Lovelock, Arne Naess, Peter Singer, to name just a few prominent 
representatives of that thought tradition.  
  12
shift in ethical perspective on its own is not sufficient to change moral practice. As I 
show in the next section of the paper, there are other barriers that work silently below 
the surface, unseen and unquestioned, because they too have become naturalised as 
unquestionable facts of daily life. Once these invisibles are raised to the surface and 
rendered visible they can become subject to scrutiny and public debate. De-
naturalised they are transformed from habits of mind to moral and conceptual tools. 
As such they can be adapted and changed in service of a responsible ethic for futures 
of our making.  
 
 
Knowledge Practices of and for the Future 
The habits of mind I want to surface for examination in this part of the paper act as 
barriers to the ethic of responsibility discussed above. They hinder the quest for 
knowledge practices that could be appropriate for closing the responsibility gap 
between the awesome power to effect time-space distantiated change and the inability 
to accompany those actions to their destinations and potential effects. As I have 
suggested earlier, this ethical vacuum requires more than change to our ethical 
knowledge base. Practice can only begin to shift once our implicit assumptions are 
brought up to date with already unfolding im/material processes, ‘the deeds already 
underway’.  
 
Causal analysis and teleological explanation 
How we relate to the future is tied to our understanding of the future and how the 
connection to the past is conceptualised.  We can think of the future as arising from 
the past, as a continuation of what has been. Alternatively, we can think of it as a goal 
or end towards which things and processes are developing. The social scientist and 
phenomenologist Alfred Schutz (1971) explained the difference between the two 
causes along the following lines: when we give ‘because’ explanations we refer to the 
past and preceding events, which we retrospectively rationalise as causes for our 
actions. When in contrast we give ‘in-order-to’ explanations, we refer to the future 
and our plans, values and desires as purposes and thus reasons for actions. Both, he 
argued, are valid ways to account for our behaviour but they draw on different 
cognitive resources, are located in and oriented towards different temporal spheres, 
and differ greatly in their accessibility to empirical investigation. Moreover, these two 
irreducibly different ways of understanding the relation between things and processes 
have implications for our capacity to extend ourselves into the future; it is these I 
want to explore below. First, however, I briefly need to outline the difference between 
past and future oriented causation. 
 
A cause binds events into significant relations. Through the construction of causal 
chains we create coherence. Thus, when we want to know about any event we 
implicitly ask for causes: How did the pollution or contamination occur? Who was 
responsible? For explanations to these and questions like them, we would look for 
event chains that are linked in some necessary fashion in a move from the present to 
the past and back again. The preceding events (that is, the past) would hold the clues 
to events in the present. This seems almost invariably so because our contemporary 
western thought world and understanding are inextricably bound to the thinking in 
causal terms. Equally, our western languages are permeated by words that assume a 
causal relation between events: to produce, determine, affect, bring about and 
generate are just a few of the more pertinent examples. Causal thinking, I want to 
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assert, is a central pillar of contemporary western understanding of how the world 
works.  
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, it is equally influential in the disciplines charged to 
explain this world. In psychology Freud looked toward the past to explain the present, 
seeking to unravel the causal chains that led to current afflictions. Treatment involved 
recovery of the repressed and its cathartic release. In the social sciences, Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber demanded causal adequacy for all social explanations. 
Durkheim wanted us to understand the genesis of social processes, to trace them 
backwards and explore them through preceding causes. Weber insisted that causal 
explanation had to be provided alongside interpretations of the meanings involved. 
All three theorists recognised that scientific explanation was causal, that the present 
and future arising from the past was the scientific way of understanding temporal 
relations. As scientists, in other words, they could not evade causal explanation. They 
understood further that our ability to know the present on the one hand, and to make 
predictions, forecasts and inductive inferences about the future on the other, crucially 
depended on knowledge of past-based causation.  
 
We can think of causation by prior events as the future created by a push from the 
past. This thought tradition, which dominated understanding for the past 300 years, 
had been preceded by modes of understanding the future that differed significantly 
from this scientific way. The teleological perspective on the future held that any 
meaningful explanation of activity needed to involve conceptions of purpose. It was 
not just concerned with how something occurred but why it did so and what it was for. 
Whenever we address the question ‘why?’ we are in the human realm of purposes and 
plans, of goals, ends, ideals, values, ethics and morals. Moreover, with a teleological 
perspective on causation we are implicitly acknowledging human freedom, that 
people orient towards their beliefs and values and that these involve the element of 
choice. We can think of this purposive causation as a pull from the future that 
influences actions in the present. This perspective on the future involves beings with 
minds and motives that orient towards imagined futures that have yet to be realized.  
 
Teleological explanations have a long history reaching back to Greek antiquity. Telos 
is Greek for end, goal, task, purpose or perfection; teleology the study of such ends. 
Aristotle gave teleological explanations his most detailed attention. As part of this 
work, he identified four types of causes: material, efficient, formal and final. In each 
of these the future featured to varying degrees of temporal depth. It was absent in the 
material cause, which refers to the physical source of something, barely present in the 
efficient cause, which he defined as the initial impulse that started the process.  In the 
formal cause, which is the idea or the blueprint that shapes a thing, the future features 
as preceding plan. However, the most notable role for the future was reserved for the 
final cause, which Aristotle saw as the goal or end for the sake of which an action was 
taken, and which thus guided the process. Aristotle understood the final cause as 
internal governing principle that applied to both human action and physical/material 
change. To explain any coming into being, therefore, required reference to all four 
causes. 
 
Teleology also played a major role in religious beliefs and practices. With 
Christianity, for example, final causes took on a new guise. Our world of purpose and 
goal-directedness was believed to point to a beneficent, omnipresent, all-powerful 
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creator God, a God who designed the world to fulfil its god-given nature. In other 
words, a universe that shows signs of design and purpose provided numerous 
indicators for the existence of a god.  As designer of the universe this god determines 
our destiny. Our soul, the immortal part of mortal existence, is oriented to its final 
destination, its journey through the transitory state of earthly existence guided by its 
spiritual goal. The influence, however, is never one of pre-determination. Rather, the 
human condition of free will forces us to make choices along this path to the spiritual 
realm of eternity. 
 
Karl Marx was the social scientist most explicitly concerned with how the world 
ought to be, after first having understood the causal relations that brought about a 
state of affairs he designated socially unjust and in need of change towards more 
equitable social relations. Marx provided a utopian vision that brought the future 
within human reach. Collective action and the application of science were the means 
to achieve the social goal. In Marx’s teleology the belief in progress and the 
perfectability of the human condition were still untainted. Despite his 
acknowledgement of the potential dangers of technology, his faith in its power to 
deliver the desired reduction of toil remained firm: it was up to owners, designers and 
operators to put technology to appropriate use. 
 
In the biological sciences Darwin’s evolutionary theory fundamentally changed the 
way cause was understood in nature. Evolutionary theory dispensed with both the idea 
of a designer God and with Aristotle’s formal and final causes. It solved the problem 
of forms and ends in nature by focusing on the function of parts within wholes. 
Darwin explained the teleological character of the world in non-teleological terms, as 
evolution giving rise to functionally organised systems and intentional agents. In the 
life sciences, therefore, teleological explanations appear in the guise of functions 
ascribed to parts embedded in larger wholes: organs in bodies, bees in hives, 
individuals and groups in species. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries these 
functional teleological explanations were taken up in the social sciences to explain the 
role of individuals for the maintenance of social structure and order. Overall, 
however, we can observe that with the rise of science to dominant knowledge the 
scope of teleological explanations decreased whilst causal explanations increased 
until they were naturalised as norm.  
 
To recap, then, in teleological explanation the emphasis is not merely on how the 
world is but on how it might be or ought to be. It answers to the question ‘why’? It 
entails a conception of goals, ends and purposes, of planning and a planner, of design 
and a designer. It acknowledges that, even if a planned event does not happen, it is 
nevertheless influenced by that future vision, purpose or intent. Despite its evident 
importance for social life, however, that form of teleological explanation was 
considered out of bounds as far as traditional science is concerned, with only its 
functionalist version being retained. Questions about morals, ethics, values, the good 
and the just have been positioned outside the boundary of legitimate scientific 
enquiry. Only the past became eligible as both source and path to truth on the one 
hand, and to knowledge about the future on the other. Given that in today’s industrial 
societies science is the dominant source of evidence-based knowledge and economics 
the justification for action, as I have argued above, this poses problems when we want 
to present an ethical and moral case for a long-term perspective on the social 
production of the future: be this for ecological considerations, spiritual concerns or 
the rights of future generations. Taking responsibility for the eventual outcomes of 
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today’s future producing actions, I want to argue, necessitates that we develop an 
appropriate modern form of teleological explanation, a new teleology that can provide 
a sound basis for socially responsible relations to the futures of our making.  
 
What might this contemporary teleology involve and how might it be incorporated 
into the politics of our globalised world? I want to return to these questions in the last 
section of the paper when I bring the moral and conceptual tools together in an effort 
to show openings for change towards an approach that addresses current 
responsibility deficits5. First, however, I want to consider the impact of materialism, 
as second pillar of scientific knowledge, on the contemporary moral imperative of 
responsibility to and for the future. 
 
Material reality and the virtual real  
The issues under consideration here are as follows: the understanding of the real, the 
emphasis on matter and the reliance on quantification. All occur in a contemporary 
context where much of the socio-economic relations and productions are no longer 
encompassed by the materialism of old. To understand the depths of the problems 
involved, we have to return briefly to the stereotypical conception of science. In the 
conventional natural sciences, as I have indicated above, reality pertains exclusively 
to the material world. All things physical are real: matter, objects, things, the stuff that 
bumps into each other and produces movement, the world that is connected by causal 
relations, all that is accessible to our senses and scientific measurement. From a 
materialist perspective therefore the future is unreal. It has none of the qualities that 
are defined as real under the materialist episteme. And yet…  
 
Nuclear radiation, for example, works unseen and largely unmeasured, silently and 
invisibly beyond the reach of our senses at the level of cells, without being clearly 
connectable to its causes. Similarly, some of the chemical processes operate in the 
realm of the ‘unreal real’ with effects emerging as problems in mammals’ 
reproductive capacity, one and more generations down the line, somewhere along the 
food chain. As far as genetically modified plants are concerned, there is as yet little of 
those un/real processes and effects to report, apart from the monarch butterfly and a 
few plant species that have begun to hybridise6.  
 
In a parallel economic world, in the meantime, futures are traded on financial markets 
where fortunes are made on this particular ‘immaterial unreal’. In the realm of 
electronic communications viruses of the unreal kind stalk our real internet 
communications, infecting healthy software and bringing down entire communication 
systems. Clearly, the conventional definition of the material real and its association 
with sense data, measurement and quantification is no longer appropriate to the 
contemporary condition. The ‘real’ has mutated while the conceptual tools are stuck 
in a previous age. Steeped in the narrow, materialist conception of reality, we remain 
impervious to the im/materiality7 of the contemporary world of our making. This 
                                                 
5 The ultimate aim of this three-year research project is to bridge the gap that arises in the interstices 
between the capacity to act and the inability to know, between the ability to create futures and the 
failure to accompany those productions to their eventual time-space distantiated destinations. 
6 On this subject of invisible, latent dangers, see Adam 1998, Timescapes of Modernity. The 
Environment and Invisible Hazards 
7 im/materiality to signify that we are referring to a reality that is, from a conventional perspective, 
simultaneously both material and immaterial 
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mismatch between conceptual tools and the contemporary im/materiality has the 
effect that we demand proof for things we cannot see, touch, taste, smell or hear, and 
insist on mapping material relations for processes that operate on a different plane, 
creating effects in different times and places without visible and/or traceable 
connections.  
 
The concept of ‘the virtual’ could come to the rescue here, were it not for the recent 
exclusive association of ‘virtual reality’ with information technology8. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines the virtual as ‘that [which] is so in essence or effect, 
although not formally or actually’. This definition would allow for the intangible, 
latent, im/material quality of some of the contemporary techno-processes that are not 
accessible to the senses and evade scientific detection until effects and symptoms 
arise somewhere, some time in the future. On the basis of this definition, the virtual 
could allow for their ‘reality’ status, although it would have to be redefined along 
non-materialistic lines. In addition to this definitional shift, it would be vital to sever 
the virtual’s association with the imaginary on the one hand and with the immediate 
future on the other. This would be necessary since both linkages would weaken the 
concept’s potential for handling the ‘unreal real’, best represented as un/real and the 
‘immaterial material’, best represented as im/material.  Most important, however, for 
our purposes, would be the need to distance the virtual from its identification with the 
world of hypermedia, given that the strong association there with simulation, illusion 
and de-territorialised space would destroy the concept’s potential to challenge the 
dominant econo-scientific materialism and metaphysics of the present. The 
hypermedia connection clearly reduces the attraction of the virtual as a conceptual 
tool with the capacity to denote an alternative real presence that is im/material, 
in/visible, absent and latent, thus irreducible temporal. In contrast to the virtual of the 
world of information technology, the virtual as defined in the Oxford English 
Dictionary allows us to proclaim the produced but not yet knowable future to be real 
and thus provides a potential first scaffold upon which to erect a political structure of 
responsibility for the techno-futures of our making. 
 
Spatial politics and chronopolis 
At a more practical level we can observe that, to date, the politics of liberal 
democracies continue to be oriented towards space (that is, territories extending from 
regions and nations to the globe) whilst in the world of business the politics by 
alternative means are conducted in and with time. Millions of dollars are made every 
second world-wide in the interstices between time zones, on options, derivatives and 
futures that do not yet and may never exist as goods in the conventional sense. The 
whole world in the present is the operational realm of trans-national companies and 
institutions freed from particular territories. Their temporal domain is real time. 
Whilst the power of trans-national corporations and institutions increased with every 
step in the direction of de-territorialisation and de-materialisation of information and 
financial transactions, the power of the nation state seems to have decreased 
proportionally. Information technology, which operates at near the speed of light, has 
facilitated this escape from locality and provided those best equipped to use this new 
technology to the full with powers that were previously the exclusive preserve of gods 
and angels: the be everywhere at once and nowhere in particular, to affect everything 
for on open-ended future. With new elites operating unencumbered in the 
                                                 
8 For an excellent treatise on the subject of the virtual, see Rob Shields’ (2003). 
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extraterrestrial, im/material realm of the virtual real, the locally and nationally bound 
are left to pick up the material pieces: the damage to communities and the 
environment into an open future. Zygmunt Bauman (1998: 8) writes about ‘the great 
war of independence from space’ which frees the winners of that war from 
territorially based legal constraints, from being held accountable for the consequences 
of their actions, from obligations and duties to local communities and daily life, and 
from responsibility for the long-term effects of their parasitic actions. This particular 
responsibility gap too requires attention to the habits of mind that are out of sync with 
contemporary practices. 
 
The conventional space orientation of Liberal Democracies is closely tied up with the 
scientific materialism discussed above: things in space are real. Material objects that 
can be traded and quantified are real. Territories, people, institutions, traffic, crime, 
budgets and Gross National Products – all can be counted and measured. They are 
quantifiable, thus real. However, when the impacts of the econo-political decisions 
extend into open futures, the reliance on materialism and quantification becomes 
inoperable. To take account of the future is to encompass the unknown and the 
unknown is not quantifiable. And yet, despite this obvious difficulty, the tradition of 
quantification is taken for granted. Quantification is a precondition to most 
environmental regulation, guidelines, taxation, and legal definitions. When the 
processes involved are time-space distantiated and marked by contingency, time-lags 
and periods of invisibility, or when they are so drawn out that their beginnings and 
ends, their inception and effects, can no longer be held together (neither in theory nor 
in practice), then the quest for quantification of the problem becomes futile9. 
Quantification and causal analysis loose their pertinence. In contexts of 
im/materiality, latency and the virtual real they become inappropriate conceptual tools 
for political action. Instead, they can only demonstrate ever more sharply the 
uncertainty of the future for societies wed to the industrial way of life and for all other 
societies implicated in the effects of that particular socio-political system. 
 
In response to these inappropriate political habits of mind, Saulo Cwerner (2000) 
developed the concept of chronopolitanism as both a conceptual and ethical tool. ‘It is 
a move’, Cwerner (2000:331) explains, ‘that has the explicit aim of extending social 
and political responsibilities to past, present and future generations, as well as to the 
diversity of histories and rhythms of life that co-exist in the global present’. His work 
points to inequalities arising from the taken-for-granted, thus un-debated politics of 
time in general and the future in particular. He asks for a time-based polis and 
citizenship that transcends current international political processes and suggests, that   
…the chronopolitan ideal is mindful of the rights of future generations. These 
rights are already inscribed in the actions and thoughts of the living, in that 
present actions extend temporally to various times in the future… The 
memory of previous colonizing enterprises must be allowed to warn us about 
the power of present generations over defenceless, voiceless future ones. 
(Cwerner 2000: 337) 
What Cwerner is therefore proposing, it seems to me, is an exercise in memory of 
futures where we remember past visions of the future and accompany their effects 
into our present. Practice in such empathic memory and imagination may turn out to 
be an important pre-condition for extending knowledge and responsibility into our 
                                                 
9 For the problem of quantification in the contemporary socio-environmental context, see also Adam 
1995, 1998 and 2000. 
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present future in order to accompany potential effects and future oppressions in a 
spirit of responsibility.  In summary we can therefore say, that the intangible realm of 
time and especially the future poses problems for Liberal Democracies’ materialist 
knowledge base. Given, however, that futures are created now by scientific, 
technological, economic and military means, they are de facto part of socio-political 
life and thus need to be explicitly incorporated into socio-political structures and 
socio-economic processes. 
 
 
Minding Futures 
Looking back over the issues raised in this paper, it strikes me that there is much 
conceptual recovery work to be done. Memories of past practices need to be activated 
to aid the process of making connections whilst moving into new directions. Past 
knowledge spheres need to be explored, their treasures re-discovered to be adapted for 
new contexts and contemporary use. My argument has been throughout that it is not 
sufficient for this change in ethical foundations to prepare the ethical ground only. 
Rather, a whole raft of traditional scientific and economic habits of mind require 
radical transformation before the responsibility gap can be closed. 
 
Reflecting on the habits of mind we have explored, it seems to me that we cannot 
extend ourselves into the future with the conceptual tools of conventional past-based 
science and present-oriented economics. Utopias would aid that particular shift in 
temporal direction but their association with social engineering, techno-scientific 
progress and certainty about the means to a predetermined goal makes them singularly 
unsuited to the contemporary task. Aristotelian teleology, in contrast has much to 
offer that could be adapted for the purpose. There is an urgent need, therefore, to 
recover the teleological perspective as legitimate temporal other to the past and 
present orientation of science and economics. Only when the im/materiality of such 
goal and value orientation has gained equivalence of acceptance can Hans Jonas’ 
‘ethics of the future’ and the ‘imperative of responsibility’ begin to get instituted. In a 
similar vein past competences and trust in metaphysics require our attention. We have 
much to learn, I want to argue, from the way predecessors handled the realm beyond 
physics, from their thoughts on the matter and from their varied solutions. Recourse to 
the virtual is just one way how one might approach the im/material, in/visible, latent 
un/real; it is certainly not the only one.  
 
The language we use in this enterprise becomes crucial. It needs to evade dependence 
on vision and materiality whilst avoiding a shift too far into the world of imagination. 
There is no question that engagement with and taking responsibility for that which 
does not yet exist in conventional material form requires a very powerful imagination. 
This imagination, however, should not be associated with the realm of fantasy. 
Instead, it needs to be grounded, theoretically strong and ethically persuasive. 
Forethought, rather than foresight, foreknowledge, prediction or precognition, would 
be one of the words with the right kind of connotation and feel. Equally helpful would 
be the idea of ‘calling futures to mind’ as it makes reference to action and activity of 
the mind. Another positive association exists with the word minding: ‘minding the 
future’ (or better still, futures in the plural) provides us with multiple meanings where 
each one of them plays on the appropriate registers. All make reference to care and 
mindfulness. When the quest for mastery, control and certainty is accompanied by a 
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quest for ‘minding the unknown’ and for ‘thinking forth the latent and potential’, the 
hubris of mastery is irredeemably tempered.  
 
‘Memory of futures’ and ‘remembrance of futures’, could be helpful because both 
allude to the implication and interpenetration of past and future and subtly remind us 
that past and future depend on our minds to bring them forth, activate them into 
existence. Where the idea of memory becomes particularly helpful is with regard to 
the aids associated with memory, aids that help us remember. While we want to avoid 
visually based terms because of their connection to the senses and conventional 
materiality, the use of aids—be they visual, conceptual, moral, literary, televisual or 
social – is invaluable for the recovery of the past and is most likely equally invaluable 
for the uncovering of the future, for accessing the virtual real. These, however, are 
first thoughts only that cannot be explored in detail here but have to become the 
subject of another investigation.  
 
Finally I want to reiterate that the contemporary problem of the future cannot be 
solved by exclusive focus on the future. Rather, it requires memories of past futures to 
inspire the kind of approaches to the future that might enable contemporary industrial 
societies to accompany technological innovations to their eventual materialisation 
where ever and whenever this might be. In this paper I could do no more than begin 
this process: to open up the issues, show potential avenues for development, raise 
questions and bring to the surface what is currently hidden in the naturalised realm of 
assumptions below the surface. 
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